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Abstract
In recent years, the Netherlands and Germany have added
themselves to the ever-growing number of countries opting
for the creation of an international commercial court. The
Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC) and the German
Chambers for International Commercial Disputes (Kammern
für internationale Handelssachen, KfiH) will conduct pro-
ceedings entirely in English and follow their own, diverging
rules of civil procedure. Aspiring to become the future ven-
ues of choice in international commercial disputes, the NCC
law and the legislative proposal for the establishment of the
KfiH allow parties to agree on their jurisdiction and entail
detailed provisions regulating such agreements. In particu-
lar, the NCC requires the parties’ express and in writing
agreement to litigate before it. In a similar vein, the KfiH
legislative proposal requires in some instances an express
and in writing agreement. Although such strict formal
requirements are justified by the need to safeguard the pro-
cedural rights of weaker parties such as small enterprises
and protect them from the peculiarities of the NCC and the
KfiH, this article questions their compliance with the require-
ments upon choice of court agreements under Article 25 (1)
Brussels Ibis Regulation. By qualifying agreements in favour
of the NCC and the KfiH first as functional jurisdiction
agreements and then as procedural or court language
agreements this article concludes that the formal require-
ments set by the NCC law and the KfiH proposal undermine
the effectiveness of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, complicate
the establishment of these courts’ jurisdiction and may thus
threaten their attractiveness as future litigation destinations.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the Netherlands and Germany have
added themselves to the ever-growing number of coun-
tries opting for the creation of an international commer-
cial court.1 The Netherlands Commercial Court2 (NCC)
and the German Chambers for International Commer-
cial Disputes3 (Kammern für internationale Handels-
sachen, KfiH) allow for a wholesale trial, including the
pronouncement of the judgment in English and recast of
civil procedure by adopting their own, diverging rules.
In this way, the NCC and the KfiH aspire to attract
international commercial disputes and thus gradually
become the future venues of choice.
The NCC law and the legislative proposal for the estab-
lishment of the KfiH provide that parties should agree
on the jurisdiction of these courts and entail detailed
provisions regulating such agreements. Yet, a glance at
the respective provisions reveals that the formal require-
ments set upon agreements in favour of the NCC and
the KfiH are multiple and stricter when compared to
1. For the similar initiatives in other EU Member States, see Ministry of
Justice (Ministère de la Justice), Inauguration of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce (Inauguration de la chambre commerciale internatio-
nale), 12 February 2018 available at: www.justice.gouv.fr/la-garde-des-
sceaux-10016/inauguration-de-la-chambre-commerciale-
internationale-31291.html (last visited 14 July 2018); Belgian Chamber
of Representatives (Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers),
Legislative Proposal for the establishment of the Brussels International
Business Court (Wetsontwerp houdende oprichting van het Brussels
International Business Court), 10 December 2018 available at: http://
www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/54/3072/54K3072011.pdf (last visited
20 December 2018); G. Rühl, ‘Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen
Handelsgericht?’, Juristen Zeitung 1073 (2018); M. Requejo Isidro,
‘International Commercial Courts in the Litigation Market’, Max Planck
Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, Research Paper Series
(2019). See also the articles on different jurisdictions in this issue of
Erasmus Law Review.
2. Parliamentary Papers II 2016/17 (Kamerstukken II 2016/17), 34 761,
nr. 3 Explanatory Memorandum (Memorie van Toelichting) (hereinafter
Explanatory Memorandum 2017) available at: https://
zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34761-3.html (last visited 14 July
2018).
3. German Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag), Legislative proposal for the
establishment of Chambers for International Commercial Disputes
(Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung von Kammern für internationale
Handelssachen), Drucksache 19/1717 of 18 April 2018 available at:
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/017/1901717.pdf (last visited
14 July 2018) (hereinafter Legislative proposal 2018);
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the Brussels Ibis Regulation,4 the key European instru-
ment regulating choice-of-court agreements in cross-
border civil and commercial disputes. The rationale of
these formal requirements could be partly traced in the
various concerns and objections that have accompanied
the emergence of the NCC and the KfiH. Whereas the
NCC law has mainly attracted criticism for its high
court fees,5 the proposal for the establishment of the
KfiH has attracted attention for the use of English
before court.6 It is, in particular, feared that procedural-
ly weaker parties, such as small enterprises, may unwill-
ingly find themselves caught in an expensive trial in a
foreign and incomprehensible language. So as to allay
the fears of unfair trial, the provisions pertaining to
jurisdiction agreements in favour of the NCC and the
KfiH are replete with procedural safety valves, ensuring
the will of the parties to litigate before a court with
higher court fees and in a language that does not sound
all ‘Greek’ to them.
This article analyses the provisions regulating agree-
ments in favour of the NCC and KfiH and aims to
assess their compatibility with the Brussels Ibis Regula-
tion. The choice for the NCC and the KfiH is based
upon the consideration that both courts reflect the con-
cerns associated with the creation of international com-
mercial courts and, therefore, strictly regulate agree-
ments in their favour. Furthermore, while both propos-
als were until recently awaiting their approval by the
national parliaments, it appears that the international
commercial courts in the Netherlands and Germany
share not only a present but a future as prospective
rivals too.7
4. Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast),
[2012] OJ L 351/1.
5. Senate (Eerste Kamer), Report of the meeting of 4 December 2018
(Verslag van de vergadering van 4 december 2018) (2018/2019
nr. 10); Parliamentary Papers I 2017/18 (Kamerstukken I 2017/18), 34
761, B Reply to the Statement of Objections (Memorie van Antwoord),
at 3-5; Parliamentary Papers I 2017/18 (Kamerstukken I 2017/18), 34
761, C Detailed Report from the first Commission for Justice and Securi-
ty (Nader voorlopig verslag van de vaste commissie voor Justitie en Vei-
ligheid), at 2-3; Parliamentary Papers I 2018/19 (Kamerstukken I
2018/19), 34 761, D Further Reply to the Statement of Objections
(Nadere Memorie van Antwoord), at 3-5. All available at: https://
www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34761_engelstalige_rechtspraak
(last visited 20 December 2018).
6. Inter alia T. Handschell, ‘English als Gerichtssprache?’, Zeitschrift für
Rechtspolitik 103 (2010); A. Piekenbrock, ‘Englisch als Gerichtssprache
in Deutschland?’, Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 1 (2010);
C. Stubbe, ‘English als Gerichtssprache?’, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik
195 (2010); A. Flessner, ‘Deutscher Zivilprozess auf English – Der
Gesetzentwurf des Bundesrats im Lichte von Staatsrecht, Grundrechten
und Europarecht’, Neue Juristische Online-Zeitschrift 1913 (2011);
C. Bisping, ‘Conquering the Legal World: The Use of English in Foreign
Courts’, European Review of Private Law 541 (2012); W. Hau, ‘Fremd-
sprachengebrauch durch deutsche Zivilgerichte – vom Schutz legitimer
Parteiinteressen zum Wettbewerb der Justizstandorte’, in R. Michaels
and D. Solomon (eds.), Liber Amicorum Klaus Schurig (2012) 49, at
61-62; H. Roth, ‘Modernisierung des Zivilprozesses’, Juristenzeitung
(2014) 801, at 805.
7. G. Dalitz, ‘Justizinitiative Frankfurt – too little too late?’, Zeitschrift für
Rechtspolitik 248 (2017). See also the high ranking of both countries in
civil justice in World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018 avail-
Sections 2 and 3 discuss the provisions regulating the
jurisdiction of the NCC and the KfiH. Having demon-
strated that the NCC law and the KfiH proposal set var-
ious formal requirements on agreements in favour of
these courts, Section 4 explores whether, and to what
extent, these requirements contradict the formal
requirements on choice-of-court agreements as pro-
vided in Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation. By
alluding to the origins of Article 25 (1) and the related
case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), this
article demonstrates that the proposed restrictions clash
with the wording and the underlying rationale of the
Brussels Ibis Regulation. Section 5 explores the conse-
quences of such a clash by qualifying agreements in
favour of the NCC and the KfiH, first, as functional
jurisdiction agreements and, then, as procedural or
court-language agreements. Based on this analysis, Sec-
tion 6 concludes that the formal requirements set by the
NCC law and the KfiH proposal undermine the effec-
tiveness of Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation, com-
plicate the establishment of these courts’ jurisdictions
and may thus threaten their attractiveness as future ven-
ues for international commercial disputes.
2 The Jurisdiction of the NCC
2.1 Agreements in Favour of the NCC
On 1 January 2019, the NCC opened its doors to pro-
spective litigants8 after the Dutch Senate finally voted in
favour of the respective legislative proposal.9 The idea
for the creation of an English-language court specialised
in international commercial disputes took root in 2014,
when Frits Bakker, chairman of the Dutch Council for
the Judiciary, first heralded the NCC.10 A mere year lat-
er, the Council for the Judiciary published its plan for
able at: http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#table (last visited 14 July
2018).
8. Official Gazette of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Staatsblad van het
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden), 475 Decree of 18 December 2018 deter-
mining the date of entry into force of the Act of 12 December 2018
amending the Code of Civil Procedure and the Act on court fees for civil
cases in connection with making English-language jurisprudence possi-
ble at the international trade chambers of the Amsterdam District Court
and the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (475 Besluit van 18 december
2018 tot vaststelling van het tijdstip van inwerkingtreding van de Wet
van 12 december 2018 houdende wijziging van het Wetboek van Bur-
gerlijke Rechtsvordering en de Wet griffierechten burgerlijke zaken in
verband met het mogelijk maken van Engelstalige rechtspraak bij de
internationale handelskamers van de rechtbank Amsterdam en het ge-
rechtshof Amsterdam) available at: https://www.eerstekamer.nl/
behandeling/20181220/publicatie_inwerkingtreding/document3/f=/
vkuf4m88czxa.pdf (last visited 20 December 2018).
9. Senate (Eerste Kamer), Senate approves the Netherlands Commercial
Court (Eerste Kammer steunt Netherlands Commercial Court) available
at: https://www.eerstekamer.nl/nieuws/20181211/eerste_kamer
_steunt_netherlands (last visited 20 December 2018).
10. Council for the Judiciary (Raad voor de Rechtspraak), Plan for the
establishment of the Netherlands Commercial Court (Plan tot oprichting
van de Netherlands commercial court, Inclusief kosten-batenanalyse),
November 2015, at 4 available at: https://www.rechtspraak.nl/
SiteCollectionDocuments/plan-netherlands-commercial-court.pdf (last
visited 14 July 2018).
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the establishment of the NCC and lend to the court its
basic contours. According to the judiciary’s plan, high-
value and complex international commercial matters are
increasingly decided by foreign courts, such as the Lon-
don Commercial Court, or arbitral tribunals. As a result,
Dutch courts deal less and less with complex interna-
tional cases, despite their knowledge and expertise.11 It
is, therefore, the NCC’s aim to attract commercial liti-
gants that often flee abroad or resort to arbitration for
the resolution of their disputes.
The provisions regulating the NCC’s jurisdiction are
geared towards this aim to attract international commer-
cial disputes. According to the new Article 30r of the
Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke
Rechtsvordering,12 Rv) and the NCC Rules,13 an action
can be brought before the NCC as long as it concerns a
civil or commercial matter with an international
aspect.14 Unlike its name suggests, the NCC is only a
chamber of the Amsterdam District Court,15 and, there-
fore, its jurisdiction cannot be larger than the jurisdic-
tion of the latter. This means that the NCC does not
judge cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Subdis-
trict Court, such as cases with a claim of up to 25,000
Euros, disputes related to employment, tenancy and
consumer matters.16 In addition, the NCC does not hear
cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of other
courts such as the Enterprise Chamber of the Amster-
dam Court of Appeal, the Patent Chamber of the Dis-
trict Court of the Hague and the Maritime Chamber of
the Rotterdam District Court.17
Furthermore, the NCC is competent when the parties
have designated the Amsterdam District Court as the
competent forum or the Amsterdam District Court has
jurisdiction on another ground.18 Since English is the
language of proceedings before the NCC and since the
NCC applies its own set of procedural rules, the parties
should, moreover, have expressly agreed in writing on
the use of the English language and the application of
the NCC Rules.19 By agreeing on the NCC Rules, the
parties also implicitly agree on bearing the higher NCC
court fees, amounting to 15,000 Euros in first instance
11. Ibid., at 5; Explanatory Memorandum 2017, at 1-3.
12. Available in English in A. Burrough, S. Machon, D. Oranje, L. Frakes &
W. Visser (eds.), Code of Civil Procedure, Selected Sections and the
NCC Rules (2018).
13. Council for the Judiciary (Raad voor de Rechtspraak), Rules of Proce-
dure for the International Commercial Chambers of the Amsterdam Dis-
trict Court (NCC District Court) and the Amsterdam Court of Appeal
(NCC Court of Appeal), NCC Rules/NCCR, December 2018, available
at: https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/rules.aspx (last vis-
ited 20 December 2018).
14. Art. 30r (1) Rv; Art. 1.3.1. (a) and (b) NCC Rules.
15. Art. 30r (1) Rv; Art. 1.1.1. NCC Rules.
16. Art. 30r (1) Rv in combination with Art. 93 Rv; Art. 1.3.1. (a) NCC
Rules; Explanatory notes to Art. 1.3.1 (a) NCC Rules.
17. Explanatory Memorandum 2017, at 14; Art. 1.3.1. (a) NCC Rules;
Explanatory notes to Art. 1.3.1 (a) NCC Rules. See also Council for the
Judiciary, Plan, above n. 9, at 12.
18. Art. 30r (1) Rv; Art. 1.3.1. (c) NCC Rules; Explanatory notes to Art.
1.3.1 (c) NCC Rules.
19. Art. 30r (1) Rv; Art. 1.3.1. (d) NCC Rules.
and 20,000 Euros on appeal.20,21 Lastly, the agreement
of the parties to litigate before the NCC shall be
included in the originating document.22
The legislative proposal and subsequent parliamentary
papers highlighted that since the NCC is only a special-
ised chamber, the parties’ agreement to litigate before it
is not a choice-of-court agreement. An agreement in
favour of the NCC is merely a procedural agreement,
where parties agree to litigate in English and in accord-
ance with the NCC Rules.23
Consequently, a choice-of-forum clause indicating as a
competent court, the Amsterdam District Court should
not be interpreted as a choice in favour of the NCC,
even if the dispute is a civil and commercial matter with
an international character.24 However, since a request
for referral of the case to the NCC is possible, the par-
ties may request the Amsterdam District Court to refer
their case to the NCC.25
Article 30r Rv and the NCC Rules pertaining to the
jurisdiction of the NCC reflect its international com-
mercial focus and, in addition, stress the importance of
the parties’ agreement to litigate before it. The NCC
distinguishes itself from the rest of the Dutch courts
since it conducts trials in English and applies its own
rules of civil procedure. The parties’ agreement justifies
such a deviation and safeguards that these will not get
unwillingly caught in an expensive trial in English.
Hence, the NCC draws and owes its competence to the
parties’ agreement.
2.2 The Requirement of an Explicit Agreement
in Writing and Its Rationale
So as to ensure the parties’ will, Article 30r Rv and the
NCC Rules do not suffice to require an agreement.
They additionally introduce the requirement of an
explicit and in writing agreement.26 Similarly, the
explanatory notes to the NCC Rules repeat the explicit-
ness requirement and clarify that when, for instance, an
agreement in favour of the NCC is included in a party’s
general terms and conditions, it is without legal effect
unless the other party has expressly and in writing
accepted the clause. In support of the requirement for
an explicit agreement in writing, the notes subsequently
refer to the Explanatory Memorandum to the NCC
law.27
20. Art. 9a Act on court fees for civil cases (Wet griffierechten in burgerlijke
zaken); Explanatory Memorandum 2017, at 17.
21. See the article of E. Bauw in this issue of Erasmus Law Review.
22. Art. 4.1.2. (b) NCC Rules.
23. Parliamentary Papers I 2018/19 (Kamerstukken I 2018/19), 34 761, D
Further Reply to the Statement of Objections (Nadere Memorie van
Antwoord), at 6. See also Explanatory Memorandum 2017, at 5-6;
D. J. Oranje, ‘The Coming into Being of the Netherlands Commercial
Court’, Tijdschrift voor Civiele Rechtspleging 122, at 123-24 (2016).
24. See also P. E. Ernste and F. E. Vermeulen, ‘The Netherlands Commercial
Court – an Attractive Venue for International Commercial Disputes?’
Tijdschrift voor Civiele Rechtspleging 127, at 127-28 (2016).
25. Art. 4.1.5. NCC Rules; Explanatory notes to Art. 1.3.1 (c) NCC Rules.
See also Ernste and Vermeulen, above n. 24, at 127-29.
26. Art. 30r (1) Rv; Art. 1.3.1. (d) NCC Rules.
27. Explanatory notes to Art. 1.3.1 (d) NCC Rules.
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According to the Explanatory Memorandum, three con-
ditions are set so as to safeguard that procedurally weak-
er parties, such as consumers and small enterprises, will
not be unexpectedly sued before the NCC. The first
condition is that the NCC only hears cases with an
international element.28 Second, an explicit agreement is
required. Therefore, the Explanatory Memorandum
underlines that an agreement to litigate before the NCC
shall not be included in general terms and conditions.
Third, as noted above, cases falling under the jurisdic-
tion of the Subdistrict Court (e.g., claims up to 25,000
Euros or consumer matters) are excluded from the
NCC’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The Explanatory
Memorandum further clarifies that the NCC law applies
without prejudice to provisions of the Dutch civil pro-
cedure law or other international instruments setting
additional restrictions for the protection of weaker par-
ties. If despite these restrictions, a consumer or a small
enterprise, nevertheless, finds itself before the NCC, it
can question the jurisdiction of this court in Dutch and
will be charged with the regular lower court fees.29
Hence, the NCC law provides for multiple safeguards
that, as the Explanatory Memorandum explains, ensure
that consumers and small enterprises will not unexpect-
edly litigate in English before an expensive court.30
3 The Jurisdiction of the KfiH
3.1 Agreements in Favour of the KfiH
The NCC is not the only international commercial court
currently established or about to be established in
Europe. In April 2018, a legislative proposal for the
establishment of the KfiH was submitted to the German
parliament.31 It is the third time the proposal is being
submitted to the parliament, succeeding two previous
unsuccessful attempts.32 The proposal authorizes the
governments of the Federal States to create a chamber
focusing on international commercial cases within the
lower State Courts (Landgerichte). Alternatively, more
28. For the definition of an international dispute in the NCC Rules see
G. Antonopoulou, ‘Defining International Disputes – Reflections on the
Netherlands Commercial Court Proposal’, Nederlands Internationaal
Privaatrecht 740 (2018).
29. Explanatory Memorandum 2017, at 6, 14, 16; Art. 30r (4) Rv; Arts.
1.3.4, 6.2 and 10.1 NCC Rules.
30. Explanatory Memorandum 2017, at 10-11, 14. See also Oranje, above
n. 23, at 124-25.
31. Legislative Proposal 2018.
32. German Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag), Legislative proposal for the
establishment of Chambers for International Commercial Disputes
(Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung von Kammern für internationale
Handelssachen), Drucksache 17/2163 of 16 June 2010 available at:
dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/021/1702163.pdf (last visited
14 July 2018); German Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag), Legislative
proposal for the establishment of Chambers for International Commer-
cial Disputes (Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung von Kammern für
international Handelssachen), Drucksache 18/1287 of 30 April 2014
available at: dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/012/1801287.pdf (last
visited 14 July 2018).
States may agree on the creation of common and, there-
fore, centralised KfiH.33
The use of English as a court language and its impor-
tance for the jurisdictional appeal of the German courts
is highlighted throughout the legislative proposal. The
proposal underlines that the conduct of trials in English
aims to attract international parties that usually, so as to
avoid litigation in German, are driven to litigate abroad
or before arbitral tribunals.34 That the use of English as
court language is the ‘selling’ feature of the KfiH
becomes, moreover, apparent in the subsequent sections
of the proposal, where a lot of ink is spent on the princi-
ple of the publicity of trials and how this is maintained
despite the use of English in court.35
A dispute can be brought before the KfiH as long as it
falls under the jurisdiction of the lower State Courts.36
Hence, just as the NCC, the jurisdiction of the upcom-
ing chambers cannot be larger than the jurisdiction of
the court they form a part of. Subsequently, additional
requirements are set to determine which cases are eligi-
ble to be heard by the chambers. Since the KfiH are an
alternative – English – version of the already-existing
Chambers for Commercial Disputes (Kammern für Han-
delssachen), the same provisions apply.37 In consequence,
the first condition is that the dispute should be a com-
mercial dispute in the sense of Article 95 of the German
Courts Constitution Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz,
GVG38). Second, the dispute should have an interna-
tional element. Since, as remarked, the use of English as
court language is the most prominent feature of the
upcoming chambers, the agreement of the parties to liti-
gate in English constitutes the third and most important
condition for the establishment of their jurisdiction.
Accordingly, draft Article 253 (3a) of the German Code
of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung,39 ZPO) pro-
33. Legislative Proposal 2018, Explanatory Statement (Begründung), at
13-14.
34. Ibid., Problem and aim (Problem und Ziel), at 1; Explanatory Statement
(Begründung), at 15. See also G.-P. Calliess and H. Hoffmann, ‘Effek-
tive Justizdienstleistungen für den globalen Handel’, Zeitschrift für
Rechtspolitik 1 (2009); H. Hoffmann, Kammern für internationale Han-
delssachen (2011), at 105-9; M. Pika, ‘Die Kammer für internationale
Handelssachen’, Zeitschrift für Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht 206
(2016); G. Wagner, Rechtsstandort Deutschland im Wettbewerb
(2017), at 224-26; H. Hoffmann, ‘“Von Law – Made in Germany” zu
“Commercial Litigation in Germany”, Impulse für eine Verbesserung
der Justiz im internationalen Handelsrecht’, Zeitschrift für internatio-
nales Wirtschaftsrecht 58, at 61 (2018).
35. Legislative Proposal 2018, Explanatory Statement (Begründung), at
8-10.
36. See also for Art. 93 GVG W. Zimmermann, in W. Krüger and
T. Rauscher (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung
(2017) Art. 93 GVG, at margin no. 1; Art. 94 GVG, at margin no. 2.
37. Draft Art. 114c GVG; Legislative Proposal 2018, Explanatory Statement
(Begründung), at 15-16; C. Hoppe, ‘English als Verfahrenssprache –
Möglichkeiten de lege lata und de lege ferenda’, Praxis des Internatio-
nalen Privat-und Verfahrensrechts 373, at 376 (2010).
38. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, Official Journal of the Federal Republic of
Germany (Bundesgesetzblatt, hereinafter BGBl.) I, at 1077. Available in
English at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gvg/ (last vis-
ited 14 July 2018).
39. Zivilprozessordnung BGBl. I, at 3202; 2006 I, at 431; 2007 I, at 1781;
BGBl. I, at 1151. Available in English at: https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html (last visited 14 July 2018).
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vides that the parties should attach their agreement to
litigate in English or the defendant’s written declaration
of consent to the statement of claim.40
As opposed to the NCC legislative documents, which
characterise agreements in favour of it as procedural
agreements, the German proposal employs a different
term. In particular, the proposal qualifies agreements to
litigate before the KfiH as court-language agreements
where parties merely agree to litigate in English. Subse-
quently, the proposal draws a parallel between court-
language agreements and choice-of-court agreements. It
stresses the proximity of a court-language agreement to
a choice-of-court agreement and points towards the
need to limit the parties’ freedom to choose the court
language just as the freedom to choose a court is limited
under German law. The underlying rationale of such a
limitation is once again the need to protect weaker par-
ties, such as consumers.41 As a result, draft Article 114b
GVG repeats in part Article 38 ZPO, which sets various
restrictions upon choice-of-court agreements. More
specifically, draft Article 114b GVG distinguishes
between agreements concluded before and agreements
concluded after the dispute has arisen. Agreements to
litigate in English concluded before the dispute has aris-
en are permissible under the condition that the parties
to the agreement are merchants, legal persons under
public law or special assets (Sondervermögen) under pub-
lic law. Agreements to litigate in English concluded
after the dispute has arisen are permissible irrespective
of the identity of the parties as long as they are explicit
and in writing.
3.2 Requirements upon Agreements in Favour of
the KfiH and Their Rationale
It becomes apparent that as opposed to the single obli-
gation to conclude an explicit and in writing agreement
in the NCC provisions, the German proposal sets a
bundle of limitations. In particular, the requirement for
an explicit and in writing agreement depends upon the
time the agreement was concluded and the identity of
the parties.
Since merchants are considered parties experienced in
commercial and legal matters, the second sentence of
draft Article 114b GVG grants them the freedom to
agree on the use of English as court language and thus
litigate before the KfiH without the obligation to abide
by a specific form.42 Whether a party is a merchant
depends on the lex fori, including its conflict-of-laws
rules.43 The German proposal, and its more liberal han-
dling of commercial parties, is driven by the considera-
40. Legislative Proposal 2018, Explanatory Statement (Begründung), at 15.
41. Ibid., at 16.
42. R. Bork, in R. Bork and H. Roth (eds.), Stein/ Jonas Kommentar zur
Zivilprozessordnung (2014) Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no. 9, 19; R. Patzi-
na, in W. Krüger and T. Rauscher (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zur
Zivilprozessordnung (2016) Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no. 1, 5; C. Hein-
rich, in H.-J. Musielak and W. Voit (eds.), Zivilprozessordnung Kom-
mentar (2018) Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no. 1.
43. P. Mankowski, in T. Rauscher (ed.), Europäisches Zivilprozess-und Kol-
lisionsrecht (2016) Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 76,
84.
tion that these are familiar with legal matters and thus
fully aware of the implications of an agreement to liti-
gate in English. In addition, the freedom to conclude ex
ante agreements, before the dispute has arisen, serves
the predictability of the competent forum and, thus, in
turn, enhances legal certainty44 – something that is
highly regarded in international commercial relation-
ships.45
In contrast, the third sentence of draft Article 114b
GVG refers to agreements to litigate in English con-
cluded after the dispute has arisen and declares these
permissible irrespective of the parties’ identity under
the condition that they are express and in writing.
Hence, consumers may also bring their disputes before
the KfiH as long as they have concluded the respective
agreement after the dispute has arisen and have addi-
tionally abided by the stricter form requirements. The
German proposal for the establishment of the KfiH
opens up the upcoming chambers to consumers based
on the consideration that when parties enter an ex post
agreement, they are more conscious of the implications
of such an agreement and thus less in need of legal pro-
tection.46 However, it should be borne in mind that
since the KfiH will exclusively handle cases that qualify
as commercial under Article 95 GVG,47 only a few con-
sumer cases will meet the requirements set in this provi-
sion and thus hit trial before the specialised chambers.
Nevertheless, a literal reading of the German proposal
may give the misleading impression that after the
dispute has arisen, merchants should also conclude an
explicit and in writing agreement. Drawing from Article
38 ZPO, upon which draft Article 114b GVG is based,
it should be noted that merchants are free to conclude
their agreement to litigate in English without abiding by
any form requirement irrespective of the point in time
such an agreement was concluded.48 If specific parties
enjoy the freedom to conclude a formless agreement
even before the dispute arose, it would make all the
more sense to retain this freedom after the dispute
arose.
44. Legislative Proposal 2018, Explanatory Statement (Begründung), at 15.
45. Inter alia R. Fentiman, ‘Theory and Practice in International Commercial
Litigation’, International Journal of Procedural Law 235, at 238 (2012).
46. Bork, above n. 42, Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no. 37; Patzina, above n. 42,
Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no. 7; for the similar provision of Art. 19 Brus-
sels Ibis Regulation, see P. Mankowski and P. Nielsen, in U. Magnus
and P. Mankowski (eds.), Brussels Ibis Regulation (2016) Art. 19 Brus-
sels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 12.
47. Draft Art. 114b and 114c (1) GVG; Legislative Proposal 2018, Explana-
tory Statement (Begründung), at 14, 15.
48. Legislative Proposal 2018, Explanatory Statement (Begründung), at 15.
For Art. 38 ZPO, see also Bork, above n. 42, Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no.
65; Heinrich, above n. 42, Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no. 13, 22.
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4 Clashing with the Brussels
Ibis Regulation
4.1 Choice-of-Court Agreements under the
Brussels Ibis Regulation
The formal requirements set by the NCC provisions
and the German proposal on agreements in favour of
the NCC and the KfiH give us pause. They catch and
direct our attention to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the
leading instrument under which choice-of-court agree-
ments in international civil and commercial matters are
determined. The subsequent sections get into the nitty-
gritty of Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation and Arti-
cles 30r (1) Rv, 1.3.1. (d) NCC Rules and 114b GVG.
They demonstrate that the formal requirements the lat-
ter provisions pose on agreements in favour of the NCC
and the KfiH are stricter and, therefore, clashing with
the wording and the underlying policy of Article 25 (1)
Brussels Ibis Regulation. The final section of this article
explores the consequences of such a clash.
According to Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation, if
the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that
a court or the courts of a Member State are competent
to settle any disputes that have arisen, or which may
arise in connection with a particular legal relationship,
that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction. Agree-
ments under Article 25 found the exclusive jurisdiction
of the chosen courts or court unless the parties have
agreed otherwise.49 In addition, Article 25 (1) Brussels
Ibis Regulation sets a series of formal requirements a
jurisdiction agreement should comply with so as to be
valid. The jurisdiction agreement should be either:
(a) in writing or evidenced in writing, (b) in a form
which accords with the practices between the parties or
(c) in a form which accords with international trade or
commerce usages. These formal requirements evidence
the consensus between the parties and ensure that the
jurisdiction agreement does not go unread.50 It, thus,
49. Art. 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation.
50. P. Jenard, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 1979 C 59/8,
Commentary on the sections of Title II, Section 6, Prorogation of juris-
diction, Art. 17; Case 24/76, Estasis Salotti Di Colzani Aimo E Gian-
mario Colzani v. Rüwa Polstereimaschinen GmbH, [1976] ECR 1831, at
Para. 7; Case 25/76, Galeries Segoura SPRL v. Société Rahim Bonak-
darian, [1976] ECR 1851, at Para. 6; Case 150/80, Elefanten Schuh
GmbH v. Pierre Jacqmain, [1981] ECR 1671, at Paras. 24-25; Case
71/83, Partenreederei Ms Tilly Russ, Ernest Russ v. NV Haven- & Ver-
voerbedrijf Nova, NV Goeminne Hout, [1984] ECR 2417, at Paras. 14,
24; Case 221/84, F. Berghoefer GmbH & Co. KG v. ASA SA, [1985]
ECR-2699, at Para. 13; Case 313/85, Iveco Fiat SpA v. Van Hool NV,
[1986] ECR-3337, at Para. 5; Case 106/95, Mainschiffahrts-Genossen-
schaft eG (MSG) v. Les Gravières Rhénanes SARL, [1997] ECR I-911, at
Para. 15; Case 159/97, Transporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali
SpA v. Hugo Trumphy SpA, [1999] ECR I-1597, at Paras. 19, 34; Case
387/98, Coreck Maritime GmbH v. Handelsveem BV and Others,
[2000] ECR I-9337, at Para. 13; Case 222/15 Hőszig Kft v. Alstom
Power Thermal Services, [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:525, at Paras. 37-38;
Case 436/16 Georgios Leventis, Nikolaos Vafeias v. Malcon Navigation
Co. ltd., Brave Bulk Transport ltd., [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:497, at Para.
34; Case 64/17 Saey Home & Garden NV/SA v. Lusavouga-Máquinas e
Acessórios Industriais SA, [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:173, at Para. 25.
becomes apparent that Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regu-
lation does not merely regulate the formal validity of an
international jurisdiction agreement. On the contrary,
the parties’ consensus is intertwined with the formal
validity of the agreement.51
In its Elefanten Schuh ruling, the ECJ stated that Article
17 Brussels Convention, today Article 25 (1) Brussels
Ibis Regulation, is intended to exclusively lay down the
formal requirements that jurisdiction agreements must
meet.52 In consequence, the formal requirements set in
Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation cannot be nulli-
fied by national provisions requiring compliance with
additional conditions as to form.53 By barring the Mem-
ber States from setting additional requirements, Article
25 (1) establishes unified standards throughout Europe,
thereby enhancing the predictability of the chosen court
and achieving legal certainty.54 National provisions
remain inapplicable even if their aim is, just as Article
25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation, to achieve legal certainty
and ensure the actual agreement of the parties.55
In this context, the question rises whether the additional
requirements set by the NCC provisions and the Ger-
man proposal collide with Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis
Regulation. If, as remarked, the Brussels Ibis Regulation
exclusively lays down the formal requirements that
jurisdiction agreements must meet, negating any
recourse to national law, then any additional require-
ments, such as the ones prescribed in the NCC provi-
sions and the German proposal, would clash with the
Brussels Ibis Regulation.
4.2 The NCC Rules versus the Brussels Ibis
Regulation
As mentioned, Articles 30r (1) Rv and 1.3.1. (d) NCC
Rules require an explicit and in writing agreement in
favour of the NCC. In addition, the Explanatory Mem-
orandum to the NCC proposal and the NCC provisions
51. J. von Hein, in J. Kropholler and J. von Hein (eds.), Europäisches Zivil-
prozessrecht (2009) Art. 23 Brussels I Regulation, at margin no. 27;
F. Garcimartin, in A. Dickinson and E. Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regula-
tion Recast (2015) Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 9.35;
Mankowski, above n. 43, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no.
134. See also P. Schlosser, Report on the Convention on the Associa-
tion of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction
and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and
to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice, OJ 1979,
C 59/71, at margin no. 179. Contra P. Gottwald, in T. Rauscher (ed.),
Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung (2017) Art. 25 Brussels
Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 15.
52. Case 150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH v. Pierre Jacqmain, [1981] ECR
1671, at Para. 26.
53. Case 159/97, Transporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v.
Hugo Trumphy SpA, [1999] ECR I-1597, at Para. 38.
54. Case 150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH v. Pierre Jacqmain, [1981] ECR
1671, at Paras. 24-29; Case 269/95 Francesco Benincasa v. Dentalkit
Srl, [1997] ECR I-3788, at Paras. 28-29; Case 159/97, Transporti Cas-
telletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v. Hugo Trumphy SpA, [1999]
ECR I-1597, at Paras. 35-39, 48-52; von Hein, above n. 51, Art. 23
Brussels I Regulation, at margin no. 17, 21; U. Magnus, in U. Magnus
and P. Mankowski (eds.), Brussels Ibis Regulation (2016), Art. 25 Brus-
sels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 88-90. For employment contracts,
see Case 25/79, Sanicentral GmbH v. René Collin, [1979] ECR 3423, at
Para. 5.
55. von Hein, above n. 51, Art. 23 Brussels I Regulation, at margin no. 21.
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exclude the insertion of an NCC clause in general terms
and conditions since this would run counter to the
explicitness requirement. Although the Explanatory
Memorandum and the NCC provisions only refer to the
exclusion of an NCC clause in general terms and condi-
tions, such an exclusion gives away that the requirement
for an explicit and in writing agreement stands in the
way of other forms of jurisdiction agreements too.
4.2.1 Implicit Agreements
The requirement for an explicit NCC clause contrasts
with Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation. Although
Article 25 (1) aims to ensure that the consensus between
the parties on the chosen court is, in fact, established
and requires that such a consensus must be clearly and
precisely demonstrated,56 it does not depend the validity
of jurisdiction agreements on an explicit agreement. As
a result, as long as the form requirements set in Article
25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation are fulfilled, an implicit
choice-of-court clause would suffice.57 The following
examples constitute implicit choice-of-court clauses that
have been deemed valid by the ECJ despite lacking the
parties’ explicit consent.
4.2.2 Agreements in General Terms and Conditions
First, the exclusion of inserting an agreement in favour
of the NCC in general terms and conditions comes at
odds with the established case law of the ECJ.58 Indeed,
as early as 1976, the ECJ ruled that where a jurisdiction
clause is included in the general conditions printed on
the back of a contract, the writing requirement is ful-
filled if the contract signed by both parties expressly
refers to those general conditions. Two further require-
ments should be fulfilled so as to validly incorporate a
jurisdiction clause, contained in general terms, into a
56. Case 24/76, Estasis Salotti Di Colzani Aimo E Gianmario Colzani v.
Rüwa Polstereimaschinen GmbH, [1976] ECR 1831, at Para. 7; Case
25/76, Galeries Segoura SPRL v. Société Rahim Bonakdarian, [1976]
ECR 1851, at Para. 6; Case 150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH v. Pierre
Jacqmain, [1981] ECR 1671, at Paras. 24-25; Case 71/83, Partenree-
derei Ms Tilly Russ, Ernest Russ v. NV Haven- & Vervoerbedrijf Nova,
NV Goeminne Hout, [1984] ECR 2417, at Paras. 14, 24; Case 221/84,
F. Berghoefer GmbH & Co. KG v. ASA SA, [1985] ECR-2699, at Para.
13; Case 313/85, Iveco Fiat SpA v. Van Hool NV, [1986] ECR-3337, at
Para. 5; Case 106/95, Mainschiffahrts-Genossenschaft eG (MSG) v. Les
Gravières Rhénanes SARL, [1997] ECR I-911, at Para. 15; Case 159/97,
Transporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v. Hugo Trumphy
SpA, [1999] ECR I-1597, at Paras. 19, 34; Case 387/98, Coreck Mari-
time GmbH v. Handelsveem BV and Others, [2000] ECR I-9337, at
Para. 13; Case 222/15 Hőszig Kft v. Alstom Power Thermal Services,
[2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:525, at Paras. 37-38; Case 436/16 Georgios
Leventis, Nikolaos Vafeias v. Malcon Navigation Co. ltd., Brave Bulk
Transport ltd., [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:497, at Para. 34; Case 64/17
Saey Home & Garden NV/SA v. Lusavouga-Máquinas e Acessórios
Industriais SA, [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:173, at Para. 25.
57. von Hein, above n. 51, Art. 23 Brussels I Regulation, at margin no. 25,
42; Magnus, above n. 54, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin
no. 78.
58. Dutch Bar Association (Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten), Internet
Consultation Netherlands Commercial Court Proposal (Internetconsulta-
tie Wetsvoorstel Netherlands Commercial Court), 1 February 2017
available at: https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/ncc/reactie/6cc7700f
-31e5-44b1-862a-9d192256867a (last visited 14 July 2018); S. Vlaar,
‘IPR-aspecten van het NCC-wetsvoorstel’, Nederlands Internationaal
Privaatrecht 195, at 200-1 (2017).
contract. The jurisdiction agreement is valid only if a
party exercising reasonable care could check the express
reference to the general terms and conditions and only if
the latter have, in fact, been communicated to the
party.59
The ECJ’s case law on jurisdiction agreements in gener-
al terms and conditions reveals that the court managed
to strike a balance between two competing interests. On
the one hand, the provisions regulating jurisdiction
agreements in commercial matters should not excessive-
ly overburden the parties with formalistic requirements
that are practically difficult to follow. On the other
hand, the provisions regulating jurisdiction agreements
should protect the parties from clauses that have been
smuggled into a contract against their will.60
4.2.3 Agreements According to the Parties’ Practices or
International Trade Usages
Nevertheless, a jurisdiction agreement contained in gen-
eral terms and conditions could still comply with the
formal requirements under the Brussels Ibis Regulation
even if an express contractual reference is lacking. This
is the case when, for instance, the general terms and
conditions containing the choice-of-court clause are
used in the parties’ continuing commercial relationships
and thus constitute an established practice between
them in the sense of Article 25 (1) (b) Brussels Ibis Reg-
ulation. Alternatively, these general terms and condi-
tions could reflect an international trade and commerce
usage, in the sense of Article 25 (1) (c) Brussels Ibis Reg-
ulation.61
However, the persistence of the NCC provisions on an
explicit and in writing agreement leaves no room for the
selection of the NCC in a form that accords with the
practices established between the parties or, alternative-
ly, international trade and commerce usages.
Letter (b) was initially inserted in Article 17 Brussels
Convention in 1989. It aimed at codifying the ECJ’s case
law, which had acknowledged that the parties’ long-
standing business practices may, under circumstances,
overcome the prescribed writing requirement.62 The
59. Case 24/76, Estasis Salotti Di Colzani Aimo E Gianmario Colzani v.
Rüwa Polstereimaschinen GmbH, [1976] ECR 1831, at Paras. 9-12;
Case 64/17 Saey Home & Garden NV/SA v. Lusavouga-Máquinas e
Acessórios Industriais SA, [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:173, at Paras. 27-29.
60. Jenard, Report, above n. 50, Commentary on the sections of Title II,
Section 6, Prorogation of jurisdiction, Art. 17.
61. Case 71/83, Partenreederei Ms Tilly Russ, Ernest Russ v. NV Haven- &
Vervoerbedrijf Nova, NV Goeminne Hout, [1984] ECR 2417, at Para.
18; Case 106/95, Mainschiffahrts-Genossenschaft eG (MSG) v. Les
Gravières Rhénanes SARL, [1997] ECR I-911; Case 159/97, Transporti
Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v. Hugo Trumphy SpA, [1999]
ECR I-1597; Case 64/17 Saey Home & Garden NV/SA v. Lusavouga-
Máquinas e Acessórios Industriais SA, [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:173, at
Para. 31; von Hein, above n. 51, Art. 23 Brussels I Regulation, at margin
no. 35; Garcimartin, above n. 51, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at
margin no. 9.42; P. Schlosser, in P. Schlosser and B. Hess, EU-Zivilpro-
zessrecht (2015), Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 3;
Magnus, above n. 54, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no.
96, 98; Mankowski, above n. 43, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at
margin no. 109, 122.
62. Case 25/76, Galeries Segoura SPRL v. Société Rahim Bonakdarian,
[1976] ECR 1851, at Para. 12.
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subsequent letter (c), allowing for jurisdiction agree-
ments in a form that accords with international trade
and commerce usages, dates back even earlier to 1978
and is aimed at relaxing the formal requirements set for
jurisdiction agreements. The rationale underpinning
this amendment was to adequately cater for the customs
and requirements of international trade. The interna-
tional commercial ‘flair’ of the letters (b) and
(c) becomes all the more apparent when taking into con-
sideration that their wording was based on Article 9 (1)
and (2), respectively, of the 1980 Vienna Convention on
International Contracts for the Sale of Goods
(CISG).63, 64
In light of the above, the NCC jurisdictional require-
ments clash with Article 25 (1) (b) and (c) Brussels Ibis
Regulation and the underlying considerations that lead
to the provision’s present wording. The strict require-
ment for an express and written agreement disregards
the requirements of non-formalism, simplicity and
speed in international commercial relationships65 and
complicates the establishment of the NCC’s jurisdic-
tion.
4.2.4 Third Parties
Furthermore, the requirement for an explicit jurisdic-
tion clause hinders the involvement of third parties in
trial before the NCC. Indeed, according to the Explana-
tory Memorandum, the provision on an express agree-
ment was not solely driven by the need to protect con-
sumers and small enterprises. It was additionally
prompted by the need to secure the procedural rights of
third parties who have not expressly agreed to litigate
before the NCC in English and according to its rules.66
The ECJ has been more than once called to interpret the
agreement requirement set in Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis
Regulation in respect of third parties that neither were a
party nor had expressly consented to the jurisdiction
agreement. Despite the absence of an express consent,
the court extended the effects of jurisdiction agreements
on third parties under specific conditions.
63. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (Vienna, 11 April 1980) UN Treaty Series 1489, 3.
64. M. de Almeida Cruz, M. Desantes Real and P. Jenard, Report on the
Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portu-
guese Republic to the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its
interpretation by the Court of Justice with the adjustments made to
them by the Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark,
of Ireland and of the United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern
Ireland and the adjustments made to them by the Convention on the
accession of the Hellenic Republic (1990), at Para. 26; P. Jenard and
G. Möller, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement
of judgements in civil and commercial matters done at Lugano on 16
September 1988 (1990), at Paras. 56-58; Schlosser, Report, above
n. 50, at Para. 179; Case 106/95, Mainschiffahrts-Genossenschaft eG
(MSG) v. Les Gravières Rhénanes SARL, [1997] ECR I-911, at Para. 16.
See also Art. 1:105 The Principles on European Contract Law available
at: www.trans-lex.org/400200/_/pecl/#head_1 (last visited 14 July
2018).
65. See Case 106/95, Mainschiffahrts-Genossenschaft eG (MSG) v. Les
Gravières Rhénanes SARL, [1997] ECR I-911, at Para. 18.
66. Explanatory Memorandum 2017, at 10.
In its very first decision on the matter, the court was
called upon to examine whether a jurisdiction clause
inserted in the statute of a company constitutes an
agreement between the company and its shareholders
within the meaning of Article 17 Brussels Convention.67
The ECJ answered this question in the affirmative,
regardless of the fact that a shareholder may have
opposed the adoption of the clause or may have become
a shareholder after the clause was adopted.68 The formal
requirements set in Article 17 Brussels Convention are
satisfied if the jurisdiction clause is contained in the
statutes and those are lodged in a place accessible by the
shareholders or contained in a public register.69 The
ECJ based its ruling in the Powell Duffryn case on the
principle of legal certainty. Any other interpretation
would lead to a multiplication of fora for disputes
between the company and its shareholders, even though
they arise from the same factual and legal relationship.70
Contrary to the ECJ’s ruling in the Powell Duffryn case,
the NCC provisions’ requirement for an explicit juris-
diction clause and the exclusion of the insertion of such
a clause in general terms and conditions suggests that an
NCC jurisdiction clause could not be validly inserted in
the statute of a company.71
Another prominent example among the court’s case law
concerning the third-party effect of jurisdiction agree-
ments are the ECJ’s rulings on bills of lading. The ECJ
extended the effects of jurisdiction agreements in bills of
lading on third parties under the double condition that
the jurisdiction clause is valid pursuant to Article 25 (1)
Brussels Ibis Regulation between the initial parties and
that the third party, by acquiring the bill of lading, has
succeeded to the shipper’s rights and obligations under
the relevant national law.72 The ECJ’s rulings on bills of
lading and the conditions set therein for the third-party
effect of jurisdiction agreements are equally applied in
every situation involving third parties that succeed one
of the initial parties to a jurisdiction agreement.73
67. Case 214/89, Powell Duffryn plc v. Wolfgang Petereit, [1992] ECR
I-1745.
68. Ibid., at Paras. 17-19.
69. Ibid., at Paras. 26-29.
70. See also Case 34/82, Martin Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v. Zuid
Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging, [1983] ECR I-987, at Paras. 13-15.
71. Dutch Bar Association (Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten), Internet
Consultation Netherlands Commercial Court Proposal (Internetconsulta-
tie Wetsvoorstel Netherlands Commercial Court), 1 February 2017
available at: https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/ncc/reactie/6cc7700f
-31e5-44b1-862a-9d192256867a (last visited 14 July 2018); Vlaar,
above n. 58, at 202. See also De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek N.V.,
Internet Consultation Netherlands Commercial Court Proposal (Inter-
netconsultatie Wetsvoorstel Netherlands Commercial Court), 31 Janu-
ary 2017 available at: https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/ncc/reactie/
efabc64e-d6c6-4254-b2a9-72dd8026478c (last visited 14 July 2018).
72. Case 71/83, Partenreederei Ms Tilly Russ, Ernest Russ v. NV Haven- &
Vervoerbedrijf Nova, NV Goeminne Hout, [1984] ECR 2417, at Para.
24; Case 387/98, Coreck Maritime GmbH v. Handelsveem BV and
Others, [2000] ECR I-9337, at Para. 23; Case 159/97, Transporti Cas-
telletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v. Hugo Trumphy SpA, [1999]
ECR I-1597, at Para. 41.
73. Case 352/13, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v.
Akzo Nobel NV, Solvay SA/NV, Kemira Oyj, FMC Foret SA, Evonik
Degussa GmbH, Chemoxal SA, Edison SpA, [2015] ECLI:EU:C:
2015:335, at Para. 65; von Hein, above n. 51, Art. 23 Brussels I Regula-
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However, the NCC’s jurisdictional requirements con-
tradict Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation and the
ECJ’s rulings on the third-party effect of jurisdiction
agreements. By excluding third parties from the NCC’s
jurisdictional reach, the NCC provisions disregard that
legal and, in particular, commercial relationships fre-
quently ‘change hands’.
4.2.5 Submission by Appearance
Lastly, the requirement for an express NCC clause
stands in the way of a submission by appearance.
According to Article 26 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation, a
court of a Member State before which a defendant
enters an appearance shall have jurisdiction, unless the
appearance was entered to contest the jurisdiction or
where another court has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant
to Article 24. Just as Article 25, Article 26 (1) Brussels
Ibis Regulation establishes the jurisdiction of a court
based on the parties’ implicit agreement to litigate
before it.74 The claimant brings his lawsuit before this
court, and the defendant appears before it, leaving the
court’s lack of jurisdiction unchallenged and willing to
contest the lawsuit on the merits.75 However, contrary
to jurisdiction agreements, a submission by appearance
takes place at a later stage, during the trial.76 The fact
that a submission by appearance is one more form of an
implicit jurisdiction agreement hints at the conclusion
that the mere appearance of the parties before the NCC
would not suffice to establish the jurisdiction of the lat-
ter.
This section has shown that the requirement for an
explicit agreement in writing clogs up the way to the
NCC to various forms of agreements, such as agree-
ments in the statute of a company or agreements con-
cluded in a form that accords with the parties’ practices
or international commercial usages. In consequence, the
NCC provisions come at odds with Article 25 (1) Brus-
sels Ibis Regulation and the rationale underpinning the
provision’s present wording. The NCC’s jurisdiction
appears, thus, enmeshed in formal requirements that do
not reckon with the realities of commercial transactions.
4.3 The German Proposal versus the Brussels
Ibis Regulation
Just as the NCC provisions, the requirements set on
agreements in favour of the KfiH by the German pro-
tion, at margin no. 64; Magnus, above n. 54, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regu-
lation, at margin no. 161; Mankowski, above n. 43, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis
Regulation, at margin no. 151-52.
74. On the equivalence of submission by appearance to an implicit jurisdic-
tion agreement: Case 48/84, Hannelore Spitzley v. Sommer Exploita-
tion SA, [1985] ECR 787, at Paras. 13-15; Case 111/09, Česká podni-
katelská pojišťovna as, Vienna Insurance Group v. Michal Bilas, [2010]
ECLI:EU:C:2010:290, at Para. 33. See also Jenard, Report, above n. 50,
Commentary on the sections of Title II, Section 6, Prorogation of juris-
diction, Art. 18.
75. Garcimartin, above n. 51, Art. 26 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no.
9.100; A.-L. Calvo Caravaca and J. Carrascosa González, in U. Magnus
and P. Mankowski (eds.), Brussels Ibis Regulation (2016), Art. 26 Brus-
sels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 1.
76. Calvo Caravaca and Carrascosa González, above n. 75, Art. 26 Brussels
Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 1, 23.
posal barely reconcile with the formal requirements laid
down in Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation. Unlike
draft Article 114b GVG, Article 25 (1) depends the val-
idity of a choice-of-court agreement upon a series of
alternatively listed formal requirements, regardless of
the identity of the parties. In consequence, commercial
parties are also bound by the formal requirements pre-
scribed in Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation.77
Therefore, it appears that the second sentence of draft
Article 114b GVG is more liberal than the Brussels Ibis
Regulation, granting commercially and legally informed
parties the freedom to conclude an agreement to litigate
before the KfiH without the obligation to abide by any
form requirement. However, draft Article 253 (3a) ZPO
seems to put a strain on this freedom. In particular,
Article 253 (3a) ZPO requires the claimant to attach the
agreement or the defendant’s declaration of consent to
litigate in English to the statement of claim. This obliga-
tion runs counter to draft Article 114b GVG and, in
effect, cancels the freedom to conclude a formless agree-
ment.78
Let us now turn to the third sentence of draft Article
114b GVG, allowing agreements in favour of the KfiH
after the dispute has arisen as long as they are express
and in writing. As pointed out, the requirement for an
express and in writing agreement does not apply to mer-
chants, legal persons under public law and special assets
under public law that enjoy the freedom of drafting a
formless agreement, regardless of whether the dispute
has or has not yet arisen. Hence, the third sentence of
draft Article 114b GVG is left to regulate agreements in
consumer contracts. Although it is highly unlikely that
consumer cases will find their way before the German
chambers, since the Brussels Ibis Regulation hardly
allows for choice-of-court agreements in consumer con-
tracts and Article 95 GVG sets various requirements on
disputes so as to be eligible to be heard by the KfiH, a
comparison between the Regulation and draft Article
114b GVG reveals once again how far they stand.
Article 19 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation permits choice-
of-court agreements in consumer contracts as long as
they are concluded after the dispute has arisen. In addi-
tion, Article 19 (2) permits choice-of-court agreements
even before the dispute has arisen as long as they widen
the consumer’s choice of courts.79 However, Article 19
Brussels Ibis Regulation omits any additional form
requirements than the ones prescribed in Article 25 (1)
Brussels Ibis Regulation. As a result, a choice-of-court
agreement in consumer contracts should, just as every
other choice-of-court agreement, meet the formal
77. Bork, above n. 42, Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no. 22; Schlosser, above
n. 61, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 7; Mankowski,
above n. 43, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 62, 74-5.
78. Critical also B. Hess as reported in M. Sonnentag, ‘Justiz & Brexit:
Frankfurt Chamber for International Commercial Disputes – Veranstal-
tung in Frankfurt am Main am 9. August 2018’, Zeitschrift für Euro-
päisches Privatrecht 966, at 968-69 (2018).
79. Mankowski and Nielsen, above n. 46, Art. 19 Brussels Ibis Regulation,
at margin no. 22; A. Staudinger, in T. Rauscher (ed.), Europäisches
Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht (2016) Art. 19 Brussels Ibis Regula-
tion, at margin no. 2.
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requirements listed in Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regu-
lation.80 On the contrary, draft Article 114b GVG
requires an express and in writing agreement.
Just as the previous section on the NCC has shown, the
requirement for an express agreement stands in the way
of various forms of choice-of-court agreements, which
have been deemed valid by the ECJ despite the lack of
an express consensus. First, the requirement for an
express agreement necessitates an unambiguous clause
that clearly states the competent court as well as the
legal relationship such an agreement refers to.81 Fur-
thermore, the requirement for an express agreement
excludes the insertion of a choice-of-court agreement in
general terms and conditions.82 However, the likelihood
of including a choice-of-court clause in general terms
and conditions after the dispute has arisen is rather low.
At this stage of the dispute, the parties have already
concluded a contract. Hence, after the dispute has aris-
en, a choice-of-court agreement will most probably be a
separate, self-standing agreement.83
Finally, it is needless to say that the requirement for a
written agreement sharply contrasts with Article 25 (1)
Brussels Ibis Regulation, which also allows for agree-
ments evidenced in writing, in a form which accords
with the practices established between the parties or in a
form which accords with international trade or com-
merce usages.
5 The Consequences of the
Clash
5.1 A Matter of Characterisation
The previous sections have demonstrated the various
clashing points between the provisions regulating the
jurisdiction of the international commercial courts in
the Netherlands and Germany and the Brussels Ibis
Regulation. Contrary to the latter, the NCC provisions
require parties to conclude an explicit agreement in
writing when opting in favour of the NCC. The Ger-
man proposal, on the other hand, promises commercial
parties a greater freedom when agreeing on the jurisdic-
tion of the KfiH. However, the draft provisions requir-
ing the claimant to attach the agreement or the defend-
80. Schlosser, Report, above n. 51, at Para. 161; von Hein, above n. 51,
Art. 17 Brussels I Regulation, at margin no. 1 and Art. 23 Brussels I Reg-
ulation, at margin no. 79; A. Bonomi, in A. Dickinson and E. Lein (eds.),
The Brussels I Regulation Recast (2015) Art. 19, at margin no. 9.83;
Magnus, above n. 54, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no.
132; Staudinger, above n. 79, Art. 19 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at mar-
gin no. 5. For insurance matters, see Case 201/82, Gerling Konzern
Speziale Kreditversicherungs-AG v. Amministrazione del Tesoro dello
Stato [1983] ECR 2503, at Para. 20.
81. Bork, above n. 42, Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no. 39, 43; Heinrich, above
n. 42, Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no. 22.
82. Bork, above n. 42, Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no. 44; L. Rosenberg,
K. H. Schwab and P. Gottwald, Zivilprozessrecht (2018), § 37. Zustän-
digkeit infolge Parteiverhaltens, at margin no. 20.
83. Bork, above n. 42, Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no. 39. For Art. 19 Brussels
Ibis Regulation, see Mankowski and Nielsen, above n. 46, Art. 19 Brus-
sels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 18.
ant’s declaration of consent to litigate in English to the
statement of claim put a leash on this freedom and, in
effect, cancel it.
As depicted, the strict formal requirements set by the
proposals are driven by the concern to ensure the will of
the parties and, in particular, the weaker parties, such as
consumers and small enterprises, to litigate before the
NCC and the KfiH. The aim to protect the unsuspect-
ing consumers, small enterprises and third parties from
an expensive trial in a foreign language found its expres-
sion in the provisions regulating the jurisdiction of the
NCC and the KfiH and was, in particular, translated
into additional formal requirements. Thus, the require-
ment for an explicit or written agreement embodies
some of the biggest challenges surrounding the creation
of international commercial courts, namely the use of a
foreign language before court and the high court fees
several international commercial courts, such as the
NCC, introduce. However, this article has so far ques-
tioned the compliance of these requirements with the
formal requirements set by the Brussels Ibis Regulation
on choice-of-court agreements.
These divergences lay bare the question whether the
formal requirements upon agreements in favour of the
NCC and the KfiH contravene Article 25 (1) Brussels
Ibis Regulation. The answer depends on the characteri-
sation of agreements in favour of the NCC and the
soon-to-be KfiH. If agreements in favour of the NCC
and the KfiH were characterised as international juris-
diction agreements, then, under the principle of the pri-
macy of European Law, the Brussels Ibis Regulation
would prevail over national rules on jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Brussels Ibis Regulation would outlaw
Articles 30r (1) Rv, 1.3.1. (d) NCC Rules and 114b
GVG. If, on the other hand, agreements in favour of the
NCC and the KfiH were characterised as functional
jurisdiction agreements, where parties merely agree on
the jurisdiction of a specific chamber within a court,
then the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the NCC provi-
sions or the KfiH proposal would not collide, since they
regulate different kind of agreements. Hence, it all boils
down to the characterisation of agreements in favour of
the NCC and the KfiH. The following sections under-
take the tricky task to characterise agreements in favour
of the NCC and the KfiH by demarcating the regulative
scope of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the NCC law and
the legislative proposal for the establishment of the
KfiH.
5.2 Functional Jurisdiction Agreements
The Brussels Ibis Regulation primarily regulates the
international jurisdiction of the Member States’ courts.
However, some of its provisions also designate the terri-
torially competent court within a Member State. This is
the case for Articles 7 and 8 as well as Article 25 Brus-
sels Ibis Regulation.84 Whether the Brussels Ibis Regula-
tion determines both the international and the territorial
84. For the previous Art. 5 Nr. 1 lit. b Brussels I Regulation, see Case
386/05 Color Drack GmbH v. Lexx International Vertriebs GmbH,
[2007] ECR I-3699, at Para. 30. Jenard, Report, above n. 50,
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jurisdiction of a Member State’s courts depends on the
wording of the relevant provision.85 In particular, under
Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation, the parties may
choose ‘a court or the courts of a Member State’. As a
result, an agreement under Article 25 (1) designates the
internationally competent court and, upon the parties’
choice, also the territorially competent court. If the par-
ties have omitted to confer jurisdiction on a certain
court, then – and only then – the national law of the
designated Member State will determine the territorial-
ly competent court.86 In contrast, the Brussels Ibis Reg-
ulation does not touch upon national rules pertaining to
the subject-matter or functional jurisdiction of a Mem-
ber State’s courts.87 It remains, therefore, largely a mat-
ter of the Member States to identify the court with spe-
cific jurisdiction to rule on specific disputes.88
As noted above, the NCC and the KfiH are not self-
standing courts but chambers of the Amsterdam Dis-
trict Court and the lower State Courts, respectively. In
this sense, the Explanatory Memorandum to the NCC
proposal clarified that the provisions pertaining to the
jurisdiction of the NCC do not decide whether a case
can be brought before the Dutch courts. That is left to
the relevant European regulations or international con-
ventions and the Dutch civil procedure law. The NCC
law solely decides whether a case can come before the
NCC or the Amsterdam District Court.89 In a similar
vein, the proposal for the establishment of the KfiH
clarifies that just as the already-existing Chambers for
Commercial Disputes, the KfiH are specialised cham-
bers within the lower State Courts, whose jurisdiction is
a matter of allocating cases to the various judges and
chambers within a court and is regulated by law.90
The structure of the NCC and the KfiH as court divi-
sions points, indeed, towards the conclusion that agree-
Commentary on the sections of Title II, Section 2 Special jurisdiction,
Art. 5 and 6; Schlosser, Report, above n. 51, at Para. 70.
85. von Hein, above n. 51, Preliminary remarks to Art. 2 Brussels I Regula-
tion, at margin no. 3; Mankowski, above n. 43, Preliminary remarks to
Art. 4 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 44.
86. Case C-222/15, Hőszig Kft. v. Alstom Power Thermal Services, [2016]
ECLI:EU:C:2016:525, at Para. 48; Rechtbank Rotterdam,
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2018:594, at 4.5; von Hein, above n. 51, Art. 23 Brus-
sels I Regulation, at margin no. 75-76; Garcimartin, above n. 51, Art. 25
Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 9.11; Schlosser, above n. 61, Art.
25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 4, 14; Magnus, above n. 54,
Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 30; Gottwald, above
n. 51, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 66.
87. Exceptions are Art. 8 (3) and 47 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation. Schlosser,
Report, above n. 51, at margin no. 81; von Hein, above n. 51, Prelimi-
nary remarks to Art. 2 Brussels I Regulation, at margin no. 4; Schlosser,
above n. 61, Preliminary remarks to Art. 4-35 Brussels Ibis Regulation,
at margin no. 2; Mankowski, above n. 43, Preliminary remarks to Art. 4
Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 47; Gottwald, above n. 51, Art. 4
Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 15; R. Geimer, in Zöller (ed.),
Zivilprozessordnung (2018) Art. 4 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin
no. 57.
88. See also Cases 400/13 & 408/13, Sophia Marie Nicole Sanders v.
David Verhaegen & Barbara Huber v. Manfred Huber, [2014]
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2461, at Para. 32.
89. Explanatory Memorandum 2017, at 5-6.
90. Legislative Proposal 2018, Explanatory Statement (Begründung), at 14:
‘dessen Zuständigkeit im Wege der gesetzlich geregelten Geschäftsver-
teilung geregelt ist’.
ments in favour of the NCC and the KfiH are not inter-
national jurisdiction agreements but functional jurisdic-
tion agreements,91 where the parties merely agree on the
jurisdiction of a specific chamber within a court. This
leads us, in turn, to the conclusion that the additional
formal requirements set by the NCC law and the KfiH
proposal on agreements in favour of these courts do not
clash with the formal requirements on jurisdiction
agreements set by Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis Regula-
tion. As a result, an agreement contained in general
terms and conditions to resolve an international dispute
before the NCC would be valid under Article 25 (1)
Brussels Ibis Regulation and thus establish the interna-
tional jurisdiction of the Dutch courts as well as the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the courts in Amsterdam. How-
ever, such an agreement would fail to meet the formal
requirements prescribed in the NCC provisions, and
therefore, it would fail to establish the jurisdiction of the
NCC.
5.3 Lost in Terminology
Notwithstanding the Explanatory Memorandum to the
NCC law and the KfiH proposal, it should be under-
lined that the distinction between the various kinds of
jurisdiction is not always crystal clear. The example of
the existing German Chambers for Commercial Dis-
putes, of which the KfiH are an alternative, English ver-
sion, is indicative. Although the Chambers for Com-
mercial Disputes are mere chambers of the lower State
Courts, doubts have been expressed as to the characteri-
sation of the provisions pertaining to their jurisdiction
as functional jurisdiction provisions. First, Article 95
GVG sets multiple conditions so as to determine which
cases are commercial and can thus be litigated before the
Chambers for Commercial Disputes. Second, Articles
96 and 98 GVG provide that the parties shall apply so as
to bring their dispute before the Chambers. The parties’
ability to influence the internal allocation of cases
between the chambers of the lower State Courts ques-
tions the characterisation of the relevant provisions as
functional jurisdiction provisions, since the distribution
of cases within a court is typically exempted from the
parties’ choice.92 It has been, therefore, claimed that the
jurisdiction of the Chambers of Commercial Disputes
strongly resembles the subject-matter jurisdiction of a
91. In this article, the term ‘functional jurisdiction’ is used in the broader
sense and therefore encompasses the internal allocation of cases within
a court; see H. Roth, in R. Bork and H. Roth (eds.), Stein/ Jonas Kom-
mentar zur Zivilprozessordnung (2014) Art. 1 ZPO, at margin no. 58,
60.
92. Roth, above n. 91, Art. 1 ZPO, at margin no. 58, 60; W. Zeiss and
K. Schreiber, Zivilprozessrecht (2014), § 11 Die funktionelle Zuständig-
keit, at margin no. 64; R. Hüßtege, in K. Reichold, R. Hüßtege and
C. Seiler (eds.), Thomas/Putzo Zivilprozessordnung (2018), Preliminary
remarks to Art. 93-114, at margin no. 1; Rosenberg, Schwab and Gott-
wald, above n. 82, § 29. Begriff, Arten und Bedeutung der Zuständig-
keit, at margin no. 14 and § 33. Die Kammer für Handelssachen, at
margin no. 5-6. See also P. Meier, ‘Fremdsprachige Verhandlung vor
deutschen Gerichten?’, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen 1827, at 1831-1832
(2018).
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self-standing court.93 The legislative history of the
Chambers of Commercial Disputes, which were initially
envisioned as self-standing courts but subsequently
established as chambers within the lower State Courts,
further supports this view.94
Since the KfiH are an alternative form of the Chambers
for Commercial Disputes, the same doubts could be
raised. The multiple requirements set on disputes so as
to be eligible to be heard by the upcoming chambers,
such as the internationality of the dispute as well as the
conditions of Article 95 GVG, question their classifica-
tion as mere chambers of a court. In a telling way, the
proposal for the establishment of the KfiH uses, in some
instances, the term ‘subject matter’,95 whereas in others,
the term ‘internal allocation of cases’96 when referring to
the jurisdiction of the upcoming chambers. Further-
more, characterising the provisions pertaining to the
jurisdiction of the KfiH as mere functional jurisdiction
provisions may take into consideration their organisa-
tional structure as chambers but disregards the parties’
choice as one of the most important conditions to gain
access to them.
However, as remarked above, the German proposal
throws one more term on the table. So as to justify the
multiple formal requirements imposed on agreements in
favour of the KfiH, it characterises such agreements as
court-language agreements.97 On the other hand, the
Explanatory Memorandum to the NCC law in combina-
tion with the subsequent parliamentary papers charac-
terised agreements in favour of the NCC as procedural
agreements.98 Yet there are reasons to question such a
characterisation, too.
For instance, an international jurisdiction agreement
may confer jurisdiction on a third state’s neutral court,
which has no ties to the dispute or the parties. This
choice of a neutral ‘unrelated’ court is common in inter-
national commercial disputes, since it ensures that none
of the parties will enjoy the advantages of litigating
before its home-state courts.99 As a result, jurisdiction
agreements in international disputes may confer juris-
93. F. Gaul, ‘Das Zuständigkeitsverhältnis der Zivilkammer zur Kammer für
Handelssachen bei gemischter Klagenhäufung und (handelsrechtlicher)
Widerklage’, Juristen Zeitung 57, at 57-58 (1984); G. Wagner,
Prozeßvertäge (1998), at 570-72. See also H. Mayer, Kissel/Mayer Ger-
ichtsverfassungsgesetz (2018) Art. 94 GVG, at margin no. 2. For the
NCC and its resemblance to a self-standing court, see P. Ortolani and
B. van Zelst, ‘The Netherlands Commercial Court: Enforceability of
Choice-of-Court Agreements and Decisions’, Journal of Private Interna-
tional Law (forthcoming).
94. For an extensive account see H. Fleischer and N. Danninger, ‘Die Kam-
mer für Handelssachen: Entwicklungslinien und Zukunftsperspektiven’,
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 205, at 206 (2017); Mayer, above n. 93,
Art. 93 GVG, at margin no. 2.
95. Legislative Proposal 2018, Explanatory Statement (Begründung), at 14,
16.
96. Ibid., at 14.
97. Legislative Proposal 2018, Explanatory Statement (Begründung), at. 16.
98. Parliamentary Papers I 2018/19 (Kamerstukken I 2018/19), 34 761, D
Further Reply to the Statement of Objections (Nadere Memorie van
Antwoord), at 6. See also Explanatory Memorandum 2017, at 5-6;
Oranje, above n. 23, at 123-24.
99. F. Sandrock, Die Vereinbarung eines “neutralen” internationalen Ge-
richtsstands (1997), at 50-62.
diction on a court that conducts proceedings in its
national, but foreign to the parties, language and accord-
ing to its national, but alien to the parties, rules of civil
procedure. When a German company concludes with a
Dutch company a choice-of-court agreement in favour
of the London Commercial Court, the parties will nec-
essarily litigate in English and according to English civil
procedure law. In addition, the parties will pay the fees
of the London Commercial Court and will be subjected
to the reputably high lawyers’ fees in England. Hence,
every choice in favour of a foreign court entails a choice
in favour of a foreign language, a foreign set of rules
governing proceedings and the associated legal fees.100
Seen from this perspective, the distinction between pro-
cedural agreements and court-language agreements
appears a fictitious distinction that overlooks the reali-
ties of international commercial dispute resolution by
adopting a confusing nomenclature.
It could be, therefore, claimed that the strict formal
requirements set by the NCC provisions and the KfiH
proposal upon agreements in favour of these courts,
although not directly colliding with Article 25 (1) Brus-
sels Ibis Regulation, nevertheless, undermine its effec-
tive application. Despite the harmonisation of the rules
of international jurisdiction on a European level, it
remains a matter for the Member States, in the frame-
work of the organisation of their courts, to identify the
court with specific jurisdiction to rule on specific dis-
putes.101 However, although the Member States enjoy
procedural autonomy, the national laws should not
undermine the objectives of the Brussels Ibis Regulation
or render it ineffective.102 In consequence, even if agree-
ments in favour of the NCC or the KfiH are simply
agreements on the competence of a chamber within a
court or procedural agreements or court-language agree-
ments, excessive national formal requirements may cir-
cumvent the formal requirements under the Brussels
Ibis Regulation and, in effect, threaten its effectiveness.
Litigants in international disputes who wish to choose
the NCC or the KfiH cannot, in drafting their choice-
of-court agreement, solely rely on the provisions of the
100. H. Koster, ‘Netherlands Commercial Court bezien vanuit het perspectief
van het ondernemingsrecht’, in E. Bauw, H. Koster and S. Kruisinga
(eds.), De kansen voor een Netherlands Commercial Court (2018) 145,
at 147. See also E. Rubin, ‘Toward a General Theory of Waiver’, 28
UCLA Law Review 478, at 488-91 (1981); L. Mullenix, ‘Another Choice
of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure
in Federal Court’, Fordham Law Review 291, at 293-96 (1988).
101. See also Cases 400/13 & 408/13, Sophia Marie Nicole Sanders v.
David Verhaegen & Barbara Huber v. Manfred Huber, [2014]
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2461, at Para. 32.
102. Case 119/84 P. Capelloni and F. Aquilini v. J. C. J. Pelkmans, [1985]
EU:C:1985:388, at Para. 21; 420/07, Meletis Apostolides v. David
Charles Orams, Linda Elizabeth Orams, [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:271, at
Para. 69; Case 189/08, Zuid-Chemie BV v. Philippo’s Mineralenfabriek
NV/SA, [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:475, at Para. 30; Case C-379/17, Soci-
età Immobiliare Al Bosco Srl, [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:806, at Para. 26;
Staudinger, above n. 79, Introduction Brussels Ibis Regulation, at mar-
gin no. 29. See also Case C-92/12 PPU, Health Service Executive v.
S.C., A.C., [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:255, at Para. 79; Cases 400/13 &
408/13, Sophia Marie Nicole Sanders v. David Verhaegen & Barbara
Huber v. Manfred Huber, [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2461, at Paras.
31-32.
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Brussels Ibis Regulation. A detour via the cumbersome
and strict provisions of domestic law is necessary.103
Hence, although the NCC law and the KfiH proposal
do not directly clash with Article 25 (1) Brussels Ibis
Regulation, they, nevertheless, undermine its effective-
ness.
The German proposal for the establishment of the KfiH
illustrates how national provisions may bypass the pro-
visions of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and, in result,
vacate their effective application. In disputes falling
under the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 25 (1) Brus-
sels Ibis Regulation takes precedence over national rules
on international jurisdiction agreements. As a result, the
respective Article 38 ZPO and the stringent limits it sets
upon jurisdiction agreements104 remain inapplicable.105
However, draft Article 114b GVG partly copies Article
38 ZPO. Thus, draft Article 114b GVG revives a
national rule that would have otherwise remained inap-
plicable through the back door of the German Courts
Constitution Act and under the disguise of a court-lan-
guage agreement.
Although the formal requirements set by the NCC pro-
visions and the German proposal aim to protect parties
from the peculiarities of the upcoming courts, such as
the high court fees of the NCC and the use of English
before court, they disregard that the Brussels Ibis Regu-
lation already safeguards the parties’ agreement on the
chosen court106 and sufficiently protects procedurally
weaker parties, such as consumers.107 While Article 25
(1) lists various formal requirements to ensure that the
parties are ad idem, Article 19 prohibits disadvantageous
for the consumer jurisdiction agreements. Furthermore,
the Regulation’s provisions are driven by the aims to
facilitate the parties’ access to a court, respect party
autonomy and secure the foreseeability of the competent
forum.108 As a result, the national laws of the Member
States should not place access to justice, party autonomy
and the foreseeability of the jurisdiction at risk by add-
103. See also Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Cases 400/13 &
408/13, Sophia Marie Nicole Sanders v. David Verhaegen & Barbara
Huber v. Manfred Huber, [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2171, at Paras. 52,
58.
104. Critical against Art. 38 ZPO G. Lüke, ‘Unorthodoxe Gedanken zur Ver-
kürzung der Prozessdauer und Entlastung der Zivilgerichte’, in H. Prüt-
ting (ed.), Festschrift für Gottfried Baumgärtel (1990) 349, at 353;
O. Jauerning and B. Hess, Zivilprozessrecht (2011), § 11 Angeordnete,
vereinbarte und veranlasste Zuständigkeit, at margin no. 2; Bork, above
n. 42, Art. 38 ZPO, at margin no. 5.
105. von Hein, above n. 51, Art. 23 Brussels I Regulation, at margin no. 16;
Schlosser, above n. 61, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no. 7;
Magnus, above n. 54, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin no.
14; Mankowski, above n. 43, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at margin
no. 62; Gottwald, above n. 51, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at mar-
gin no. 76-77; Rosenberg, Schwab and Gottwald, above n. 82, § 31.
Die internationale Zuständigkeit, at margin no. 44.
106. See above Section 4.1.
107. von Hein, above n. 51, Art. 23 Brussels I Regulation, at margin no. 20.
For employment contracts, see Case 25/79, Sanicentral GmbH v. René
Collin, [1979] ECR 3423, at Para. 5.
108. Recitals 1, 3, 15, 19 and 22 Brussels Ibis Regulation. See also Case
533/08, TNT Express Nederland BV v. AXA Versicherung AG, [2010]
ECLI:EU:C:2010:243, at Para. 49.
ing additional and complex layers of national provisions
to the existing rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.109
With respect to the foreign language of the proceedings,
it is recommended that the proposals shift their focus on
the definition of international disputes. A clear defini-
tion of the international aspect of a dispute, which safe-
guards that only truly international disputes end up
before the NCC and the KfiH, would pay heed to the
parties’ increased in international disputes ability to
expect and thus foresee an English-language litiga-
tion.110
Leaving aside the clash between the Brussels Ibis Regu-
lation and the jurisdictional provisions of the NCC and
the KfiH, a final remark should be made. Requirements
for an explicit or in writing agreement turn their back to
the policy considerations underlying the Brussels Ibis
Regulation. The regulation and the respective ECJ case
law gradually relaxed the formal requirements set upon
choice-of-court agreements driven by the aim to ade-
quately cater for the customs and practices in interna-
tional trade. Excessive formalities disregard the need for
speed and simplicity in commercial transactions. More-
over, the demanding formal requirements set by the
proposals complicate the establishment of the interna-
tional commercial courts’ jurisdiction and increase the
possibility of litigation over jurisdictional issues. Such
‘boundary’ litigation, which protracts the length of the
trial and increases the litigation costs,111 favours the bet-
ter funded party and burdens weaker parties, such as
small enterprises, which the proposals after all strive to
protect.112 Hence, the strict formal requirements on
agreements set by the proposals for the establishment of
the NCC and the German KfiH overburden interna-
tional commercial parties, complicate the establishment
of the courts’ jurisdiction and may undermine their
attractiveness as future venues for the resolution of
international commercial disputes.
6 Conclusion
The establishment of the NCC and the KfiH has been
accompanied by various concerns and objections focus-
ing on the high court fees of the NCC and the use of
109. See also Requejo Isidro, above n. 1, at 3.2.1.1; Opinion of Advocate
General Jääskinen, Cases 400/13 & 408/13, Sophia Marie Nicole
Sanders v. David Verhaegen & Barbara Huber v. Manfred Huber,
[2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2171, at Para. 69; Cases 400/13 & 408/13,
Sophia Marie Nicole Sanders v. David Verhaegen & Barbara Huber v.
Manfred Huber, [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2461, at Para. 29.
110. See also Schlosser, above n. 61, Art. 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation, at mar-
gin no. 20a.
111. On the importance of litigation time and costs in commercial disputes,
see also Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report with recommenda-
tions to the Commission on expedited settlement of commercial dis-
putes, (2018/2079[INL]) available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-627.896
+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN (last visited 20 December
2018).
112. See also Fentiman, above n. 45, at 248; Wagner (2017), above n. 34,
at 217.
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English as court language before both courts. These
concerns were, in particular, projected on the provisions
regulating agreements in favour of the respective inter-
national commercial courts. The NCC law and the leg-
islative proposal for the establishment of KfiH set addi-
tional formal requirements in order to secure that the
will of the parties to litigate before them has been clearly
manifested. Yet, this article demonstrates that these for-
mal requirements undermine the effectiveness of the
Brussels Ibis Regulation, complicate the establishment
of the courts’ jurisdiction and may, as a result, under-
mine their attractiveness to international commercial
parties. It is, thus, recommended that the national legis-
lators ensure the compliance of the provisions regulating
the jurisdiction of the NCC and the KfiH with the
Brussels Ibis Regulation and safeguard that the formali-
ties of the provisions pertaining to the jurisdiction of
these courts do not override the informalities of business
practices.
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